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INTRODUCTION
In Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics, James Phillips and
Jesse Egbert identify an established tool called “corpus linguistics,”
whose applications have been extended to aid legal interpretation. 1
In their view and mine, corpus linguistics is potentially a more
valuable tool in legal interpretation than dictionaries have proven to
be. While legal opinions have, especially in recent years, frequently

* Edward Finegan is professor of linguistics and law, emeritus, at the University of
Southern California. His interests include discourse analysis, lexicography, corpus linguistics,
and forensic linguistics. He has testified as an expert in U.S. federal and state courts, chiefly in
trademark disputes and defamation claims. He is a past president of the International
Association of Forensic Linguists and curently serves as editor of Dictionaries: Journal of the
Dictionary Society of North America.
1. James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics:
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve
Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589.
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cited semantic data—word senses—from dictionaries, reliance on and
references to bodies of text called corpora are much more recent and
rare despite the fact that corpus linguistics had its beginnings in the
middle of the twentieth century. In both the title of their article and
its contents, Phillips and Egbert urge an improved methodology in
using corpora for legal interpretation. In particular, they see “valid
and reliable answers to questions about the meaning of legal texts”
as the goal of more sophisticated and scientifically sound
methodological practices. 2 In pursuit of that goal, they endorse
survey and content-analysis methodologies in the design and use of
corpora. As a general matter, their guidance is to be applauded
and implemented. There are, however, a few caveats that warrant
further discussion.
Just as “law and lexicography” is not regarded as a subfield of
law or of lexicography, regarding “law and corpus linguistics” as a
subfield of law parallel to “law and economics,” as Phillips and
Egbert do, 3 is questionable in some respects. 4 Still, reliance on
corpora and the methods of corpus linguistics could, with proper
corpus compilation and more sophisticated use, enhance the tools of
legal interpretation, as it has enhanced the tools available to linguists
serving as experts in various legal arenas for years. 5 What Phillips and
Egbert offer constitutes an invitation to more and better use of
corpora in legal interpretation. Their article also signals a caution,
however. As increased reliance on corpora makes its way into legal
reasoning and court opinions, its utility and possible persuasiveness
carry risks. As evidenced by published opinions, judges sometimes
misunderstand the structure and substance of entries in so basic a

2. Id. at 1592.
3. Id. at 1608.
4. Corpus linguistics is properly viewed more as a methodological tool than an
intellectual subfield in the way that, say, phonetics, syntax, and semantics are subfields of
linguistics, or law and economics is a subfield of law.
5. Expert testimony by linguists has relied on corpora in contract interpretation,
defamation, authorship attribution, trademark disputes (especially concerning genericity), and
possibly elsewhere. See, e.g., Zipee Corp. v. USPS, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Or. 2000); Adam
Kilgarriff, Corpus Linguistics in Trademark Cases, DICTIONARIES: J. DICTIONARY SOC’Y N.
AM., 2015, at 100, 101.
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reference work as the desk dictionary; 6 the risks of misapprehending
the structure of a corpus for particular interpretive purposes are
greater still, as was the case with Judge Posner’s use of a Google
search concerning the word harbor. 7 Further, what is true of the
corpus user is even more true of the corpus compiler. Bear in mind
that lexicographers, whose professional training enables them to
discern and define word senses from corpus data, explore data daily.
Members of the legal profession lack equivalent training and are not
likely to receive it in future.
Reliance on corpora to determine word senses is not a new
concept, and if “corpus” is understood to mean simply a body of
texts, then corpora have been in use among lexicographers for at
least a century and a half. In his nineteenth-century Scriptorium in
Oxford, editor James Murray was surrounded by walls of
pigeonholes containing millions of quotation slips, which are pieces
of paper on which sentences were copied from books and mailed to
him from readers throughout the English-speaking world. 8 The
paper slips were organized alphabetically according to the catchword
in the sentence, and the slips for each catchword were organized
chronologically in anticipation of the lexicographical work of
drafting entries for the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Organized
and reorganized in accordance with particular lexicographical needs,
the slips constituted the basis of the entries in the OED, which aimed
to trace the semantic development of every English word since its
initial appearance in any text. Instead of paper slips, today’s
lexicographers rely on computerized corpora, whose size and scope
have grown as additional older texts are digitized by libraries,
organizations, and companies such as Google. New digital texts are
also generated daily in books, newspapers, magazines, legal opinions,
blogs, emails, transcribed speeches, and other venues. Scientists,
philosophers, historians, politicians, physicians, and almost everyone

6. Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915.
7. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012); see also James C.
Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning:
A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 2016 YALE L.J. F. 21, 28–29 (2016).
8. PETER GILLIVER, THE MAKING OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2016)
(relating the story of James Murray, and the Oxford English Dictionary).
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else rely habitually on digitized texts, and countless numbers of
people are creating them. The legal profession is acquainted with
computerized corpora chiefly in Westlaw and LexisNexis. Phillips
and Egbert note that the tools of corpus linguistics are beginning to
appear as aids to interpretation in legal briefs, court opinions, and
legal scholarship. 9 There can be little doubt that exploiting
appropriate corpora when addressing questions of legal
interpretation may be more helpful than reliance on dictionaries has
proven to be in past years.
In this commentary, I strike two themes. The first is that Phillips
and Egbert are right to recommend improved methodologies in
corpus design and corpus exploitation. 10 It is significant that they
acknowledge that their recommendations present an ideal worth
striving for, rather than a practical goal that most legal analysts can
achieve on their own. Even so, much may be achieved under lessthan-ideal circumstances, and in this regard the perfect should not
become the enemy of the good.
The second theme, explored briefly in Part II, is central to all
legal interpretation. It is the question of what is meant by “public
meaning” and “ordinary meaning,” and just whose sense of “public”
and “ordinary” a corpus should seek to represent. If frequency of
meaning is a criterion for “public” or “ordinary,” computers can
count it infallibly, but whether the appropriate criterion is frequency
or something else has yet to be decided by legal theorists.
Before proceeding, further explanation of the meaning of
“corpus” will be helpful. Put simply, a modern corpus is a digitized
body of texts. Using computer software, whether associated with a
particular corpus (as with LexisNexis) or independent of it,
researchers are able to search the texts in the corpus for particular
words or expressions and to view and manipulate them in their
contexts. There are, thus, good ways of homing in on and grouping
meanings, as Phillips and Egbert explain in Part II of their article. 11
For annotated corpora (those that contain metadata such as a text’s
author, date, and provenance, or a word’s part of speech in context),

9. See Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 1613–18.
11. Id. at 1608.
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more focused searches can be executed. Generally, corpora are
compiled and annotated for particular purposes. For example,
LexisNexis and Westlaw compile the texts of statutes and case law in
various jurisdictions and annotate them to help users find what they
are seeking. Other well-known corpora, such as the million-word
Brown Corpus from the 1960s 12 and the more recent 520-millionword Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), 13 were
created largely to enable systematic inquiry into language patterns in
the English-language texts they incorporate.
I. CORPUS SIZE AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
Phillips and Egbert highlight the fact that corpus linguists differ
about the relative importance placed on corpus representativeness
and corpus size. 14 Among others, they cite Douglas Biber for
representativeness 15 and Patrick Hanks for size. 16 Biber’s research has
focused especially on similarities and differences across registers of
spoken and written English, while Hanks’s has focused on
lexicographical matters, especially word senses. 17 Biber’s 1993 papers
argue persuasively for the need for representativeness in corpus
compilation, and Phillips and Egbert are correct in saying that “[t]he
goal of good corpus design is to prepare and execute a sampling plan
that maximizes the chances of achieving a representative corpus,” 18
by which, following Biber, they mean a corpus that “includes the full
range of variability in a population.” 19 Two observations should be
borne in mind about the work of Biber and others who stress the
12. HENRY KUCČ ERA & W. NELSON FRANCIS, COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF PRESENTDAY AMERICAN ENGLISH (1967).
13. CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG. (COCA), https://corpus.byu.edu/coca (last visited
Jan. 23, 2018).
14. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1593.
15. See id. at 1594 (citing Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, 8
LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 243 (1993) [hereinafter Biber, Representativeness in
Corpus Design]; Douglas Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora for General Language
Studies, 19 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 219 (1993) [hereinafter Biber, Using RegisterDiversified Corpora]).
16. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1594 (citing Patrick Hanks, The Corpus
Revolution in Lexicography, 25 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 398, 415 (2012)).
17. See PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS AND EXPLOITATIONS (2013).
18. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1593.
19. Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, supra note 15, at 243.
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necessity of representativeness. One observation is that their work—
Biber’s in particular—has focused on the differential
distribution of grammatical features across registers, aiming
through representativeness to create a basis for “general language
studies,” 20 as spelled out in the full title of the paper and
as encapsulated in the celebrated grammar of spoken and written
English he spearheaded. 21
The other observation is that the corpora compiled for the work
of Biber and Hanks, as well as that of Geoffrey Leech and John
Sinclair (also cited by Phillips and Egbert), 22 have been designed
particularly to represent grammatical features (as with Biber and
Leech) or the lexicon (as with Hanks and Sinclair) generally; they
have not usually been designed to represent the meanings of
particular expressions in particular historical texts, which is the
central focus of legal interpretation. Because language features,
including words and their meanings and functions, may differ from
register to register (that is, across different situations of use), valid
and reliable generalizations about “writing” or about “speech” must
be drawn from a sample that is representative of written or of spoken
texts. Language is too complex and too subtle, and registers too
variable, to make generalizations based on texts that do not
represent the population under investigation. For example,
examining a corpus of transcribed talk among family members
conversing over the dinner table cannot reliably reveal much about
the linguistic features characteristic of conversations among academic
colleagues at conferences or between physicians and patients in
medical offices. Because generalizations can reflect no more than the
sampled population, representativeness is crucial. Still, Biber and
Hanks would agree that in corpus building, once representativeness
is accounted for, size is significant. And both would likewise
agree that corpora of sufficient size are needed to generalize about
“the language.” 23
20. Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 219.
21. See generally DOUGLAS BIBER, STIG JOHANSSON, GEOFFREY LEECH, SUSAN
CONRAD, EDWARD FINEGAN, LONGMAN GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN
ENGLISH (1999).
22. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1592, 1598.
23. Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 240.
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Of course, as Phillips and Egbert rightly emphasize, size alone
cannot compensate for an unrepresentative corpus. 24 To take an
obvious example, no matter how many conversations are recorded,
transcribed, and compiled in a corpus—no matter how big that
corpus—it cannot reliably reveal anything about the language of
scientific journals or legal opinions or any register other than
conversation. As suggested by the dinner table example, different
conversational environments may exhibit quite different vocabulary
and grammatical features, as well as different meanings for the same
words and different functions for the same grammatical features. On
the other hand, given virtually unlimited digital capacity, a
lexicographer who wanted to create a dictionary that laid out senses
for each headword in different contexts could expediently choose to
quarry as many texts from as many sources as possible—that is,
without representativeness but without exclusion of any available
texts. For certain lexicographical purposes, dispensing with the task
of ensuring representativeness may be cost efficient, and little would
be lost by including everything the lexicographers’ computers could
digest. As Hanks puts it in a comment quoted unfavorably by
Phillips and Egbert, “As long as the corpus builder can include a
wide variety of source texts, it is neither necessary nor desirable to be
too pernickety about questions of balance and representativeness.” 25
I take “a wide variety of source texts” to stand for an expedient way
for a lexicographer to gain sufficient representativeness but not as
suggesting that a corpus builder need not attend to representation. I
also understand “pernickety” to mean unnecessarily fussy, and for a

As the use of computer-based text corpora has become increasingly important for
research in natural language processing, lexicography, and descriptive linguistics,
issues relating to corpus design have also assumed central importance. Two main
considerations are important here: 1) the size of the corpus (including the length
and number of text samples), and 2) the range of text categories (or registers) that
samples are collected from.
Id. at 219 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that Biber’s work is generally concerned
with minimum sample sizes. So far as I can tell, nowhere does he indicate that there are
maximum sizes for corpora. It is fair to judge his view as: the bigger the better, given an
adequate “range of text categories. . . . Future research should be based on larger corpora and
include a wider representation of linguistic features and registers.” Id. at 219, 240.
24. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1598.
25. Patrick Hanks, The Corpus Revolution in Lexicography, 25 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY
398, 415 (2012); Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1594.
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lexicographer to be more than unnecessarily fussy (too pernickety)
would be counterproductive. 26
Briefly, on the matter of survey sampling in creating a corpus,
some of what needs to be observed is commonsensical, as Hanks
would well understand. For example, if one wanted to examine the
differences in the syntax and lexicon of Antonin Scalia’s dissenting
and concurring opinions (as I have), one would need a corpus of
those opinions, including annotations and metadata differentiating
the two types of opinion (or a separate corpus for each type). It
would be helpful to include as many opinions as possible within each
category or even all of them unless there were reason to exclude
some (for example, if one’s capacity to deal with large bodies of data
were limited). In the case of excluding some data, care would need
to be taken to ensure that the included texts were indeed
representative and not biased in some unconscious way—perhaps too
narrow in topic or chronology, for example. In pursuit of a different
question, researchers could enlarge the corpus to include all U.S.
Supreme Court concurring and dissenting opinions in a particular
decade or on a particular constitutional provision or in any of
numerous other ways.
Phillips and Egbert “hypothesize that words are used differently
in different registers,” 27 a matter about which there is no doubt. Of
course, they recognize that their hypothesis is accepted by corpus
linguists generally—and certainly would be accepted by all
lexicographers, including Sinclair and Hanks. The purpose, then, of
their hypothesizing is not to discredit Sinclair and Hanks, who as
proponents of the bigger-is-better school of corpus compilation
would nevertheless not deny that “word use, . . . in terms of
frequency and meaning, is heavily dependent on register.” 28 It is,
rather, to emphasize something easily overlooked by amateur corpus
builders, namely, that in building a corpus of limited size the
character of the included texts—in particular, the registers from
26. Phillips and Egbert refer to Hanks’s view that “the main conventions of use of any
word will be observable in any large corpus,” Hanks, supra note 25 at 415, as a “radical
position,” Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1598. They also quote him as clearly recognizing
and acknowledging the prerequisite need for “a wide variety of source texts.” Id.
27. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1600.
28. Id.
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which they come—must be a structured sample and must be
representative of the intended population. 29
Despite sometimes using language less precise than desirable,
every competent corpus linguist is aware that corpus design must go
hand in glove with the research aims the corpus is intended to
address. Phillips and Egbert state it this way: “Corpus design cannot
be separated from research design.” 30 They add that “[i]n most
sciences and social sciences, researchers analyze a data set that they
collected themselves” and that normally “this particular data set is
never used again for another research study.” 31 However, they point
out, “in the field of corpus linguistics, it has become the norm to
reuse the same data (or corpus) over and over again to answer a wide
range of research questions in a multitude of research studies.” 32
Phillips and Egbert understand that, to the extent a corpus has been
designed sufficiently broadly, it may legitimately be reused to answer
a range of research questions. 33 That is not to say that any question
can legitimately be asked of any corpus. Because living languages
change continually and American English usage has therefore
changed significantly since the eighteenth century, questions about
the original meaning of expressions in the Constitution cannot
legitimately be probed in a corpus of twenty-first century English.
On the other hand, for corpus developers and linguists who
exploit corpora for grammatical studies, it may be entirely legitimate
to use the same well-designed corpus for numerous investigations.
To oversimplify, a corpus well designed to answer questions about,
say, relative clauses—their frequency and character across registers—
might serve equally well for the study of adverbial clauses, noun
clauses, and many other grammatical features. The cost and effort
required to compile a large corpus cannot be readily duplicated, and
such corpora are typically designed from the outset to provide data
for a range of potential research questions involving grammar and
lexicon. For meanings of expressions used in earlier times—more
than two centuries ago for the Constitution—the texts examined
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1595.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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must reflect language usage of the time. Whether one wants to
interpret, say, “cruel and unusual punishments” 34 in terms
appropriate to twenty-first century western sensibilities or those of
the eighteenth century is a critical question—but not a question for
the corpus linguist. If one relies on a corpus to help determine the
meaning of the expression “cruel and unusual punishments” as
understood at the time it was written, a valid corpus would comprise
eighteenth-century texts, not texts written in the twentieth or
twenty-first century.
Representativeness and size are not incompatible. Much of the
discussion about the importance of representativeness arose at a time
when corpora were relatively small, making representative
composition even more important. While reliance on an impressively
large corpus drawn from inapposite or irrelevant register sources may
yield incorrect answers to linguistic questions, including questions of
meaning, arguments for representativeness have not focused on word
senses. Instead, they have focused more on grammatical features,
such as comparisons across registers of frequencies of various parts of
speech or grammatical structures: nouns, verbs, relative clauses, and
so on. For example, Biber has shown that the distribution of
dependent clause types may differ across registers. 35 It is also
unquestionably true that the distribution of word senses differs
across registers. Consider not only the well-known cases involving
the verbs use, 36 carry, 37 and harbor, 38 but other simple words such as
cite, circuit, complaint, suit, opinion, feud, joint, appearance, rider,
discovery, wrong, welfare, vacancies, blessings, ordain, magazines,
quartered, and effects. These words are likely to carry quite different
senses in legal contexts than they carry in other contexts. But corpus
linguistics cannot reveal the contextual meaning of these words
unless the interrogated corpus represents the language register
(context) in which the disputed interpretations occur.

34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
35. Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 221–22.
36. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
37. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
38. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
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II. BEYOND CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Beyond what Phillips and Egbert describe as necessary if the
methods of corpus linguistics are legitimately to serve as tools for
interpreting legal texts, there lie other more fundamental issues—
issues not for the corpus linguist but for the legal theorist. With
respect to interpreting the Constitution and its amendments, before
querying any corpus, no matter its representativeness and size, the
parameters of a larger inquiry must be clear. Is the question simply,
What is the most frequent meaning of a particular term in a
particular context? Is it, What would an ordinary citizen reading a
newspaper take the term in its context to mean? Or, What did the
Founders likely intend to convey by using that term in that context? Are
we seeking lawyers’ or citizens’ meaning, and—if the latter—which
citizens: How well educated? Men, women, both? Living on which
side of the Atlantic or both? How experienced in commerce or
business or politics? These questions and others must be addressed
even before the corpus is compiled to ensure inclusion of the
relevant texts. If a consensus can be reached as to what must be
answered—what, say, an ordinary reasonably well-informed citizen
would understand by a word or expression in the text and context in
which it occurs—then corpus linguistics can be of aid. In building a
corpus designed to answer such questions, newspapers would be
essential, particularly a selection of newspapers that is representative
of appropriate geographical spread, chronology, and other relevant
criteria. When relying on newspapers, it is not the language that
reporters and editors use among themselves that is of interest but the
language they use in their articles, because that is the language
that, as professionals, they reasonably deem their readers capable
of understanding.
In a nutshell, the fundamental question that the legal theorist
must answer is, What is meant by “ordinary meaning”? But to answer
that, one must also ask: Where is it to be found? Who uses and
understands it? Is it found in newspapers or novels? Or is it in plays,
letters, or diaries? Further, if frequency determines what is
“ordinary,” in which contexts—which registers—is frequency to be
quantified? (In news articles or editorials? In mystery, romance, sci-fi,
or all fiction? In conversation or only writing? British or North
American? Just whose usage and under what circumstances of use?).
1307
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None of what I have said is intended to suggest that
representativeness is unimportant; it is critically important, though
perhaps not equally important for all purposes. Phillips and Egbert
are right to highlight the importance of representativeness in
identifying appropriate meanings for particular linguistic expressions
in context. 39 But equally fundamental questions, not about achieving
representativeness, but about identifying and specifying what is being
represented, must be answered if the aim in the marriage between
law and corpus linguistics is to answer questions about meaning.
Corpus linguistics can provide guidance in identifying resources for
compiling a representative corpus of any kind, but only after legal
theorists identify the target population of speakers and writers—in
other words, people, registers, chronology, and so on. Corpus
linguists can compile a corpus representing whatever legal theorists
designate as the population of relevant texts. Their methodology can
also provide user interfaces for querying corpora in ways that will be
definitive, not in answering a question directly, but in providing
the data upon which a definitive answer may be based, and
it can provide the competing data so that interpreters can make
any necessary judgments.
CONCLUSION
Phillips and Egbert note that in order “[f]or corpus data to be
used as a meaningful data source in legal proceedings, corpus
creators and researchers will need to follow sound sampling
principles and practices and provide evidence to support the design
and representativeness of their corpora.” 40 Those are high standards,
higher than ones often expected in scholarship, but this is fitting
because the stakes are higher in law than in most other arenas.
Lexicographers may justifiably make expedient choices when
compiling dictionaries by exploiting corpora encompassing a wide
variety of texts and text types even when not systematically
representative. The representativeness urged by linguists interested in
describing language generally has its underpinnings in good science

39.
40.
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and in a commitment to description that will stand up to scrutiny. 41
Standards in law are higher than those in lexicography or grammar.
As a further consideration, if corpora are to be accessed by
judges, attorneys, and legal scholars, readily usable software must
accompany the corpora, along with guidelines for querying each
individual corpus and identifying what questions it can and cannot
answer. We should be mindful that a dictionary’s front matter—
including what is called the “guide to the dictionary”—has often
eluded the attention of judges 42 (and others). If corpora are to be
maximally useful tools for interpreting legal texts, instruction
comparable to that in a dictionary’s front matter is essential, and
users must understand and honor that guidance. Further, if it is
necessary for users to understand the possibilities and limitations of
particular corpora, it is even more necessary for corpus compilers to
do so, including the amateur ones Phillips and Egbert imagine
inhabiting the chambers of appellate judges and the offices of wellto-do law firms. 43 The lessons to be learned from recognizing how
some judges and their law clerks have poorly understood how to
read a dictionary’s entries make it incumbent on those working at
the intersection of law and corpus linguistics to do everything
possible to help ensure rigorous corpus compilation and utilization.
Phillips and Egbert have provided a map for jurists and legal
scholars to find their way to valid understandings of expressions
appearing in legal texts where meaning is disputed. This map helps
navigate fundamental interpretive questions: What does a particular
expression in a particular sentence in a particular legal text mean?
What would a particular expression have been understood to mean at
the time it was written? These are the kinds of questions that corpus
linguistics can help answer, and the guidance offered by Phillips
and Egbert goes a long way in ensuring that the enterprise is
scientifically sound.

41.
42.
43.

BIBER ET AL., supra note 21.
Mouritsen, supra note 6.
Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1617.
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